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BARRIERS TO REPRESENTATION FOR 
DETAINED IMMIGRANTS FACING 
DEPORTATION: VARICK STREET DETENTION 
FACILITY, A CASE STUDY 
Peter L. Markowitz* 
on behalf of 
The Subcommittee on Enhancing Mechanisms for Service Delivery 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an evolving crisis in the immigration courts and federal courts of 
appeals caused by the lack of quality representation for immigrants facing 
deportation. The problem is particularly acute for immigrants who are 
detained during their removal proceedings. As part of the Study Group on 
Immigrant Representation (Katzmann study group), the Subcommittee on 
Enhancing Mechanisms for Service Delivery undertook a case study of the 
institutional and legal barriers to quality legal representation for immigrants 
held at the Varick Street Detention Facility in New York City. Through 
this lens we hope to offer some useful insights into the core factors 
contributing to the immigration representation crisis, the institutional 
barriers that aggravate the crisis, and, finally, to propose a series of reforms 
to address the crisis. 
The numbers tell the story. In 2007, the most recent year with available 
statistics, fifty-eight percent of respondents in removal proceedings 
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Rabinovitz, Oren Root, Claudia Slovinsky, and Immigration Judge Noel Brennan, though 
she expressed no opinion as to the specific proposals. In addition, while Judge Robert A. 
Katzmann expressed no opinion about the specific proposals set forth in this report, his 
leadership in the effort to expand access to counsel for immigrants is inspirational and this 
effort, like many others, would not have been possible without him. I am also profoundly 
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appeared pro se. 1 Over the last five years, over 800,000 immigrants faced 
the prospect of deportation without the assistance of counseJ.2 Even on 
appeal, more than one quarter (twenty-eight percent) of respondents 
handled their own cases before the Board of Immigration Appeals. 3 
Detained respondents are even less likely to secure legal representation,4 
and, over the last decade, the number of immigrants in detention has 
tripled,5 with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detaining 
approximately 200,000 people a year.6 By 2007, approximately forty-two 
percent of respondents facing deportation were in immigration detention. 7 
Eight-four percent of those detainees do not have attorneys.8 By every 
measure, the scope of the representation crisis is vast.9 
Even those respondents who do secure counsel are at substantial risk of 
encountering the all-too-prevalent elements of the immigration bar that are 
either incompetent or unscrupulous. It is difficult to find numerical 
I. U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVI EW, FY 2007 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK GI fig.9 (2008) [hereinafter EOIR 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at WI fig.30. Even in the federal courts, many respondents are forced to pursue 
appeals without counsel. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Marden Lecture: The Legal 
Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 8 
(2008) ("In the Second Circuit, approximately 44% of the BIA decisions were appealed. Of 
those cases on appeal in the Second Circuit, 78% were counseled and the rest were handled 
prose."). 
4. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration 
Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 , 56 (2008). 
5. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION fN THE USA 3 (2009), available at www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/ 
JailedWithoutJustice.pdf.; see also EOIR 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note I , at 01 
fig.23 (listing figures from 2003 to 2007). 
6. AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION DETAINEE PRO BONO 
OPPORTUNITIES GUIDE 1 (2004) [hereinafter PRO BONO OPPORTUNITIES GUIDE], available at 
http ://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/probonoguidefinal .pdf. 
7. EOIR 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note I , at 01 fig.23 (stating forty-two 
percent of cases involved detainees in 2007). 
8. NrNA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING 
JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 
(2008) [hereinafter IMPROVING EFFICIENCY], available at http://www.vera.org/ 
download?file= l780/LOP%2BEvaluation ... final. .. ; see also PRO BONO OPPORTUNITIES 
GUIDE, supra note 6, at I (finding in 2004 that only approximately ten percent of 
immigration detainees were represented by counsel). 
9. In fact, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recently 
acknowledged the need to dramatically reform its detention system to, among other things, 
better facilitate access to counsel for detained respondents. See Nina Bernstein, U.S. to 
Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N .Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at Al ; Press Release, 
Dep't. of Homeland Security, ICE Announces Major Reforms to Immigration Detention 
System (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter DHS Press Release] , http://www.ice.gov/ 
pi/nr/0908/090806washington.htm. On August 6, 2009, ICE Assistant Secretary John 
Morton announced that ICE is creating an Office of Detention Policy and Planning, which 
will evaluate the immigration detention system, and include the development of a "national 
strategy for the effective use of alternatives to detention including community supervision." 
Id. 
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measures of attorney misconduct and deficient performance, but the best 
available evidence points to a serious and growing problem regarding the 
availability of legal representation, as well as the quality of such 
representations in removal proceedings. 10 
In addition to the empirical evidence, the view from the federal courts of 
appeals provides an excellent vantage point to evaluate the quality of legal 
representation in removal proceedings. A growing chorus has been rising 
from circuit judges across the political spectrum, sounding a much needed 
alarm regarding the crisis of inept and unscrupulous attorneys in significant 
sectors of the private immigration bar. 11 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has voiced deep concern about "unscrupulous . . . attorneys 
who extract heavy fees in exchange for false promises and shoddy, 
ineffective representation" in immigration cases. 12 Judge Robert A. 
Katzmann, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has 
remarked upon the "disturbing frequency, [ with which] this Court 
encounters evidence of ineffective representation by attorneys retained by 
10. See, e.g., N.Y. UNIV. CHAPTER OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, BROKEN JUSTICE: A 
REPORT ON THE FAILURES OF THE COURT SYSTEM FOR lMMIGRA TION DETAINEES IN NEW YORK 
CITY 16 (2007), available at http://www.nlgnyc.org/pdf/brokenjustice.pdf (noting that out 
of the four hundred cases observed, "[i]n some cases, the actual outcome of the trial was 
altered by poor legal representation .. .. [We] observed many breaches in very basic but very 
important courtroom conduct"); see also Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in 
Filene 's Basement, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1449, 1488 (2006) (noting that many immigrants are 
"unusually vulnerable: poor, deeply in debt, uneducated, ignorant of language and culture, 
and threatened with losing everything they have so painfully won" and briefly describing 
how nonlawyer intermediaries, such as "notarios," come to "dominate many practitioners"); 
Jennifer Barnes, The Lawyer-Client Relationship in Immigration Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1215, 
1217-18 (2003) (noting the vulnerability of the immigrant population and the abuses of 
"notarios" and other "immigration consultants"); Katzmann, supra note 3, at 8- 9 ("[T]oo 
many [attorneys] render inadequate and incompetent service. These attorneys do not even 
meet with their clients to ascertain all the relevant facts and supporting evidence or prepare 
them for their hearings; these are 'stall' lawyers who hover around the immigrant 
community, taking dollars from vulnerable people with meager resources. They undermine 
trust in the American legal system, with damaging consequences for the immigrants' 
lives."); Larry Neumeister, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Federal Court in NYC Chides Lawyers on 
Both Sides for Failing Immigrants, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-
search/we/Archives?p_product=APAB&p_theme=apab&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&s_ 
dispstring=Federal%20Court°/o20in%20NYC%20Chides%20Lawyers&p_field_advanced-
O=&p_text_advanced-0=%28%22Federal%20Court°/o20in%20NYC%20Chides%20Lawyers% 
22%29&xcal_numdocs=20&p_perpage=IO&p_sort=YMD_date:D&xcal_useweights=no. 
I I. See, e.g., Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 601 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the 
attorneys had "failed spectacularly to honor their professional obligation" and that "[w]hen 
lawyers representing immigrants fail to live up to their professional obligations, it is all too 
often the immigrants they represent who suffer the consequences"); Gjondrekaj v. Mukasey, 
269 F. App'x. 106, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting "the disturbing problems of ineffective 
assistance even by licensed attorneys in many immigration cases"); Morales Apolinar v. 
Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2008); Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1254 
(9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that preparers of asylum applications, "whether lawyers or non-
lawyers, are not always scrupulous"). 
12. Morales Apolinar, 514 F.3d at 897. 
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immigrants seeking legal status in this country."13 Judge Richard Posner, 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has also been vocal 
about the poor quality of immigration representation. 14 Unfortunately, for 
those who regularly appear in the immigration courts or serve as 
immigration judges, the observations of these circuit courts come as no 
surpnse. 
The representation crisis in deportation proceedings most directly affects 
the respondents, whose lives hang in the balance. Pro se respondents are ill 
equipped to navigate what the Second Circuit has called the "labyrinthine 
character of modern immigration law." 15 The gravity of the liberty interest 
at stake for these respondents cannot be overstated and has been 
characterized by the Supreme Court as "banishment" 16 and the "loss of all 
that makes life worth living." 17 One study found that, in predicting the 
outcome of removal proceedings, "the single most important non-merit 
factor that mattered was representation." I 8 
However, what is often overlooked in this discussion is the detrimental 
effect that the immigration representation crisis has on the other 
institutional players in the deportation system. Among institutional actors, 
the burden of unrepresented immigrants falls most heavily upon the 
immigration judges who, in pro se cases, must play the dual role of 
impartial adjudicator and counselor to the respondent. 19 In pro se cases, 
13. Aris, 517 F.3d at 596. 
14. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F .3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2005); Pervaiz v. 
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2005). 
15. Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003). 
16. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654,676 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
17. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 454 (1947) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 
U.S. 276,284 (1922)); Knauer, 328 U.S. at 659 (quoting Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284). 
18. Schoenholtz & Bernstein, supra note 4, at 55. This conclusion is supported by a 
report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, which found, in 
expedited removal cases, where many of the applicants are in detention, unrepresented 
respondents succeeded only two percent of the time, while those with counsel succeeded 
twenty-five percent of the time. Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in 
Expedited Removal: A Survey of Alternate Practices, in U.S. COMM ' N ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL II 232, 239 
(2004), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum_seekerslERS_RptVolU.pdf. 
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2009); see also 2 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK 542-43 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK] , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/vll/benchbook/index.html ("[T]he Immigration Judge has the responsibility for assuring 
that the respondent is accorded all of his rights and full due process. Also, the Immigration 
Judge should be more considerate of the unrepresented respondent. He is often frightened or 
nervous, poor, and uneducated. . . . In the case of the unrepresented respondent, the 
Immigration Judge will have to take a more active role in the development of the hearing."); 
id. at 540 ("[T]he Immigration Judge has a responsibility to advise the respondent of any 
relief to which he may be entitled to apply .... In all pro se matters, the Immigration Judge 
must be careful and solicitous of the respondent."); EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 67 (Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n 
2008), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_pagel.htm ("If the 
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immigration judges are obligated to investigate and advise respondents on 
the availability of potential defenses to removal. 20 Given the complexity of 
the legal issues involved, the inability to extract the candor achieved in 
privileged attorney-client communications, and the significant time 
constraints immigration judges face on each case, fulfilling their legal 
responsibility to counsel pro se litigants can sometimes be an 
insurmountable task. Immigration judges are often caught between this 
reality and the very real possibility that failure to fully advise pro se 
litigants can often lead to reversal of their decisions on appeal.21 
One cannot exaggerate how overburdened and under-resourced the 
immigration courts are and how pro se cases tap those scarce resources 
disproportionately. In fiscal year 2008, the nation's 214 immigration 
judges handled on average over 1500 cases apiece.22 To assist them with 
this enormous docket, immigration judges shared, on average, one law clerk 
for every six judges.23 Pro se cases require more adjournments, require 
more time in court for judges to question respondents to evaluate available 
defenses, and often require judges to spend additional time out of court 
researching legal issues without the benefit of counseled briefing. As Julie 
Myers, the former head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement recently 
explained, "[I]mmigrants representing themselves ... can mean confusion 
and delay .... [ A ]liens having representation ... could be the most positive 
thing for immigration courts that we [can] really see."24 
Pro se cases, and cases with unscrupulous or incompetent attorneys, also 
drain critical resources from ICE. There are a significant percentage of 
cases in the immigration courts where the outcome is certain from the 
outset and respondents have no avenue to escape deportation. With 
competent counsel, such cases are often resolved at an initial master 
calendar appearance with a grant of voluntary departure. However, pro se 
litigants and litigants who do not receive complete and accurate advice from 
their attorneys will often make the unwise choice to fight their deportation 
Immigration Judge decides to proceed with pleadings, he or she advises the respondent of 
any relief for which the respondent appears to be eligible."). 
20. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.l l(a)(2) (2009) ("The immigration judge shall inform the alien of 
his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this 
chapter .... "). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 832 (1987); United States 
v. Barraza-Duarte, 265 F. App'x 553 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moriel-Luna, 244 F. 
App'x 810 (9th Cir. 2007); Cooke v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 181 Fed. App'x 311 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. El Shami, 434 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sosa, 387 
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2004); Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2000); Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
22. See Immigration Crackdown Overwhelms Judges (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 9, 
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=100420476 
(statement of Dana Leigh Marks, head of the Immigration Judges Union). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. (statement of Julie Myers-Wood, former head of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement). 
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cases for months or even years, sometimes while sitting in immigration 
detention. In such situations, the lack of quality legal representation can 
become a drain, not only on the courts but also on the following: ICE's 
Office of Chief Counsel, which prosecutes removal cases; the U.S. 
Attorneys' Offices, which litigate appeals in the federal courts; the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and the federal courts of appeals, which hear appeals 
of removal orders; and ICE's Office of Detention and Removal Operation, 
which manages the immigration detention system. Moreover, one of the 
intractable problems ICE has faced in removal proceedings is the high rate 
of respondents who abscond, leading to in absentia removal orders. Here 
too, the available data demonstrates that respondents with counsel are 
significantly less likely to abscond.25 
Recognizing that the lack of quality legal representation has a detrimental 
impact on all players in the removal system, the Subcommittee on 
Enhancing Mechanisms for Service Delivery has endeavored to identify 
ways for the government, private bar, and public interest community to 
collaborate to increase both the quality and quantity of immigration 
representation. Part I below outlines the interrelated systemic factors that 
have given rise to the immigration representation crisis. Part II sets forth 
the results of our case study of the Varick Street Detention Facility and 
examines the specific barriers to quality representation faced by 
respondents in this facility. Finally, in Part III, we attempt to draw lessons 
from the case study of Varick Street and extrapolate what types of reform 
could be instituted by various actors to begin to address the crisis in 
immigration representation on a local and national level. 
I. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM: THE INTERRELATED CAUSES OF THE 
IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION CRISIS 
No progress can be made on confronting the immigration representation 
crisis until we understand the sources of the problem. The dearth of quality 
legal representation in immigration removal proceedings is caused by a 
number of interrelated factors. 
A. No Right to Appointed Counsel in Removal Proceedings 
As a starting point, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that immigration 
proceedings are civil not criminaJ26 and, therefore, it has held there is no 
25. See EOIR 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 1, at GI (noting that the 
"majority of failures to appear [are] unrepresented"); see also IMPROVING EFFICIENCY, supra 
note 8, at 3 (finding that even respondents who merely received legal information from an 
attorney were seven percent less likely to abscond than those who did not have access to the 
program). 
26. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038- 39 (1984) ("A deportation 
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to 
punish an unlawful entry .. . . "); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
("Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil 
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constitutional right to appointed counsel. 27 The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) codifies this rule, clearly stating, 
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any 
appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal 
proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being 
represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, 
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.28 
It is somewhat counterintuitive that, for example, an indigent immigrant 
who has lived here legally since childhood is entitled to a lawyer when he 
faces a night in jail for a minor criminal offense but when that same person 
faces lifetime exile from his U.S. citizen family, his career, and his home, 
he is not entitled to any legal assistance at all. There are compelling 
arguments that, as in other civil proceedings threatening grave deprivations 
of liberty-such as juvenile delinquency proceedings29 and in some 
proceedings seeking the termination of parental rights30-due process 
likewise requires that the government appoint counsel in at least some 
deportation proceedings.31 However, the law is well settled in this area and 
the judiciary has given no indication in recent years that it is inclined to 
revisit the issue. Accordingly, the lack of legal right to appointed counsel 
rather than a criminal procedure."). But see Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-
Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach To Understanding the Nature of Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008). 
27. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also Tang v. 
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 
485 (1st Cir. 1997); Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987); Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 
931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986); Delgado-Corea v. INS, 804 F.2d 261, 262 ( 4th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374, 1376 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181, 
183 ( I 0th Cir. 1986). An immigrant in removal does have the right to counsel at his or her 
own expense. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006); id. § 
l 229a(b )( 4)(A). 
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006); see also id. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) ("[T]he alien shall have the 
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's 
choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings .. .. "). 
29. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) ("We conclude that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency 
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is 
curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by 
counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be 
appointed to represent the child."). 
30. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (suggesting that due 
process can require appointed counsel in some parental termination cases). 
31. See, e.g., Mark T. Fennell, Preserving Process in The Wake of Policy: The Need for 
Appointed Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL 'y 261, 287-88 (2009); Beth J. Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Immigrants' 
Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 
393-94 (2000); Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT 
(Migration Policy Institute, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2005, at 7- 9, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/lnsight_Kerwin. pdf. 
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has been, and is likely to remain, at the heart of the immigration 
representation crisis. 
B. Financial Limitations of the Respondent Population 
Without a right to appointed counsel, the vast majority of respondents are 
left to their own devices to seek out and retain private attorneys; however, 
several factors make obtaining quality deportation defense representation 
impracticable for many. As a group, respondents tend to come from 
working class communities and have limited financial resources. While 
there are no statistics available on the economic status of respondents in 
removal proceedings, census statistics on the foreign-born population 
generally demonstrate that foreign-born individuals are more likely to live 
in poverty and have lower median household incomes than the native-born 
population.32 There is every reason to believe that the subset of foreign-
born individuals who land in deportation proceedings are, as a group, even 
less economically secure than the general foreign-born population.33 
Accordingly, many respondents simply lack the financial resources to hire 
private counsel.34 
C. Financial Disincentives for Private Attorneys To Focus on Deportation 
Defense Practice 
Moreover, there are strong financial disincentives for reputable private 
immigration attorneys to focus their practices on providing removal defense 
representation to the vulnerable detained populations. As compared to 
handling employment visas, adjustment of status and naturalization 
applications ( collectively "transactional immigration matters"), deportation 
32. See U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, available at 
http ://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet? _program=ACS&_submenuld= 
&_lang=en&_ts=; Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Data Show 
Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-Born Population (Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Census 
Bureau Press Release], available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/american_community _survey _acs/013 308.html. 
33. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, supra note 32 
( compiling Census Statistics for 2008 and listing the percentage of those at or below the 
poverty line as 24% for Mexican-born population; 14.8% for the El-Salvadorian born 
population; 19.9% for the Guatemalan-born population; 21.4% for the Honduran-born 
population; and 13 .1 % for the Chinese-born population-averaging significantly in excess of 
the general poverty rate of 13.2%), and U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND 
HEALTH COVERAGE IN THE U.S. 12-16 (2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty07.html, with EOIR 2007 STATISTICAL 
YEAR BOOK, supra note 1, at J2 tbl.7, El fig.6 (noting that the ten most common 
nationalities in removal proceedings-including Mexicans, Salvadorians, Guatemalans, 
Hondurans, and Chinese-account for 77% of all court proceedings, with Mexicans alone 
accounting for almost 36% of removal cases in 2007). 
34. See, 2 IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, supra note 19, at 542 ("[T]he Immigration 
Judge should be more considerate of the unrepresented respondent. He is often frightened or 
nervous, poor, and uneducated."). 
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defense is a much more labor intensive, unpredictable, and time-consuming 
endeavor. The client population for transactional immigration matters, on 
the whole, is significantly more financially secure than the deportation 
defense clients. As a result, private attorneys are often hesitant to take on 
the hardest, most time-consuming cases-deportation defense cases-since, 
as a general matter, those clients are the most likely to default on their 
financial obligations.35 
D. Perpetual and Systematic Underfunding of Pro Bono Deportation 
Defense Services 
For those respondents who cannot afford reputable private counsel, the 
best option is locating appropriate deportation defense services from the 
nonprofit sector. Unfortunately, the available nonprofit deportation defense 
resources are dwarfed by the demand for such services. In the New York 
Immigration Courts, the collaborative of nonprofit organizations that 
provides the vast majority of free deportation defense services, 36 the 
Immigration Representation Project, provided deportation defense 
representation to 197 respondents last year. 37 This number includes less 
than ten percent of the estimated population of unrepresented respondents 
in the New York Immigration Courts last year. 38 
The problem for these nonprofits is, of course, insufficient funding. 
Unfortunately, there are some systemic forces that threaten to keep pro 
bono deportation defense service perpetually underfunded. The three major 
sources of funding for nonprofit organizations are ( 1) the federal 
35. Alternatively, some reputable private attorneys require a sufficient retainer to ensure 
full payment. However, such retainers are simply unaffordable to many respondents. 
36. This statement does not take account of one nonattorney practitioner, an accredited 
representative, who has historically handled an extraordinary solo caseload of pro bono 
deportation defense matters in the New York Immigration Court. According to one 
immigration judge interviewed for this report, this practitioner alone handles more cases than 
any institutional provider of pro bono deportation defense services. Interview with 
Immigration Judge, in N.Y., N .Y. (Feb. 12, 2009). However, recently, after concerns were 
raised to the EOIR about the poor quality of representation provided by this practitioner, 
EOIR initiated discussions with nonprofit service providers and private attorneys about 
taking over representation on some of his cases. 
37. See Interview with Jojo Annobil, Immigration Attorney, Immigration Law Unit at 
The Legal Aid Soc'y, in N.Y., N.Y. (Sept. 18, 2009). 
38. No comprehensive statistics are publicly available regarding the number of 
unrepresented respondents in the New York Immigration Courts. However, we know the 
New York Immigration Court received 20,770 cases in fiscal year 2007. EOIR 2007 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 1, at B4 tbl.lA. We project that approximately 3000 
respondents in the New York Immigration Courts went unrepresented. We base this 
projection on the assumption that the representation rate in New York far exceeds the 
national average since New York is, relative to the rest of the country, rich in legal and pro 
bono resources and since respondents in New York Immigration Courts generally have the 
advantage of having local family members who can sometimes secure counsel. See 
discussion infra Part 11.C. 
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government, (2) the state and local governments, and (3) foundations.39 
Each, for different reasons, is generally either unable or unwilling to 
support deportation defense representation. Congress has made clear its 
disinclination to fund deportation defense work on a broad scale.40 
Moreover, the major nonprofit legal service providers in most states are 
federally funded by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC).41 Any 
organization that accepts LSC money must agree not to engage in some 
types of immigration representation, even if such representation is 
separately funded.42 States and localities generally view immigration 
matters as a federal issue and are disinclined to provide funds for 
representation before a federal agency. Finally, foundations often view the 
choice as to where to allocate their immigration oriented grants as between 
transactional immigration matters and deportation defense. For reasons 
already discussed, foundations can provide support services for many more 
individuals by funding transactional immigration matters without having to 
grapple with the difficult political issues of whether respondents in removal 
proceedings are deserving of their scarce resources. 
39. The Interest on Lawyer Account (IOLA) Fund of the State of New York has also 
historically been an important aspect of civil legal services funding in New York State. 
However, this source of funding has recently declined precipitously in the wake of the 
current financial crisis. See Impact of the State Budget on Access to Justice: Hearing Before 
the Assem. Standing Comms. On Codes, Judiciary, Governmental Operations, and 
Corrections, 232d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y . 2009) (testimony of Andrew Scherer, Executive 
Director and President, Legal Services NYC), http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=288&Itemid= l42 (noting that IOLA grants 
are projected to decrease from $31 million in December 2008, down to as little as $1 to $4 
million by December 2009). 
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
41. Legal Services Corporation, Statutory Restrictions on LSC-funded Programs, 
http://www.lsc.gov/about/factsheet_whatislsc.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) ("LSC is the 
single largest provider of civil legal aid for the poor in the nation."). 
42. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.). 
The law does, however, provide for exceptions to the bar on funding counsel for immigrants 
if it is work on behalf of lawful permanent residents, H2A agricultural workers, H2B forestry 
workers, and victims of battering, extreme cruelty, sexual assault, or trafficking. Id.; see also 
42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Legal 
Services, supra note 41. These exceptions actually would permit an LSC funded 
organization to provide deportation defense in some types of cases, perhaps most 
significantly those brought against legal permanent residents. However, an unfortunate 
consequence of the LSC immigration funding restrictions was that many civil legal service 
organizations stopped handling deportation defense cases as part of their cessation of general 
immigration assistance. For example, Legal Services NYC, the largest nonprofit civil legal 
service provider in New York, helped over 60,000 people in 2007, but did virtually no 
deportation defense work. See LEGAL SERVICES NYC, NYC 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.legalservicesnyc.org/storage/lsny/PDFs/ls-nyc_2007 _annual_report. pdf. 
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Finally, because of the dearth of pro bono services and qualified private 
attorneys willing to undertake removal defense for detained clients, many 
detainees fall prey to the disreputable sector of the immigration bar. Every 
institutional actor in the deportation system is acutely aware of the 
disproportionate instances of attorney malpractice and misconduct that 
occur among the immigration bar.43 Here too, there are systemic forces 
contributing to the high instances of disreputable attorney conduct. The 
primary issue is the vulnerability of the client population. Fifty-two percent 
of the foreign-born population are limited English proficient.44 As 
discussed earlier, they are disproportionately poor and they are significantly 
more likely to be lacking in basic education.45 Moreover, immigrants are 
less likely to be familiar with local methods to redress exploitation at the 
hands of their attorneys. These factors, together with the reality that many 
respondents fear any contact with local authorities and that many will only 
learn about their attorney's misconduct once they are deported, allow 
disreputable attorneys to act with impunity. 
Collectively these factors-the lack of right to appointed counsel, the 
financial limitations of the respondent population, the disincentives for 
reputable private attorneys to focus on deportation defense matters, the 
funding obstacles for nonprofit service providers, and the vulnerability of 
respondents to disreputable immigration attorneys-help to explain the 
causes of the immigration representation crisis and present daunting hurdles 
to addressing the crisis. 
II. VARICK STREET DETENTION CENTER: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
BARRIERS TO QUALITY REPRESENTATION FOR DETAINED IMMIGRANTS 
A. Methodology 
In order to evaluate the barriers to quality representation for immigrants 
facing removal, we undertook a case study of the barriers faced by 
detainees at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Varick 
Street Detention Facility (Varick Facility) in New York City. The primary 
method of inquiry was a series of formal and informal interviews with all 
relevant actors in the removal and detention process. Such actors include 
the detainees themselves, immigration judges, court administrators, 
members of the private bar, and representatives from public interest 
43. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
44. See U.S. Census Bureau Press Release, supra note 32. 
45. See id. (stating that sixty percent of the foreign-born population has a high school 
degree, compared to eighty-eight percent of the native born population, and also noting that 
fifty-two percent of the foreign-born population say they speak English "less than 'very 
well,"' compared to two percent of the native born population). 
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organizations that provide pro bono services to the Varick Facility 
population. Unfortunately, the DHS Field Office Director in charge of the 
Varick Facility and the Facility Director from Ahtna Technical Services, 
Incorporated (ATSI), the private company that runs the facility, both 
refused interviews for this report. We also carefully reviewed the available 
relevant data, the applicable statutory and regulatory sources of law, and the 
subregulatory policy provisions relevant to detainee access to counsel. 
From the outset we recognize that, by its very nature, the case study was 
likely to reveal both systemic nationwide barriers to quality representation 
and barriers unique to the Varick Facility. Below, we attempt to identify 
those factors that we believe may be unique or disproportionate at the 
Varick Facility. We choose to focus on a detention center because the 
population of detained respondents unquestionably faces the greatest 
barriers to quality legal representation. While some of the barriers we 
identify below are unique to the detained population, many others are also 
applicable to nondetained respondents. 
B. Varick Street Detention Facility: An Overview 
The Varick Street Detention Facility was opened as an immigration 
detention center in 1984.46 However, because it lacks an outside 
recreational area, it fell out of compliance with the detention standards 
implemented in 2000.47 For a time, the facility was grandfathered in and 
allowed to remain operational notwithstanding its lack of outdoor facilities. 
On September 11 , 2001, the facility, located in downtown Manhattan, was 
evacuated as part of the reaction to the terrorist attacks. Once emptied, it 
lost its grandfathered status and, therefore, remained shutdown for several 
years. Notwithstanding the substantial number of immigrants taken into 
custody in New York City each year, there was no local facility to handle 
the detainees. Most immigrants detained in New York were held, at least 
temporarily, in county jails in New Jersey. 
In February 2009, DHS reopened the Varick Facility as a temporary 
holding center-thereby not requiring an outside recreational area. This is 
one factor that makes the Varick Facility unlike many other immigration 
detention facilities across the country and special attention must, therefore, 
be paid to how this factor influences the findings of our investigation. 
Since reopening, DHS has contracted out the administration of the Varick 
Facility to a private prison company, ATSI, though it remains under the 
jurisdiction of DHS's Detention and Removal Operation office located in 
the same building as the detention facility. The facility holds up to 250 
46. Alisa Solomon, Op-Ed., The Prison on Varick Street, N.Y. TIMES, June 11 , 1994, at 
A21. 
47. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DETENTIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL, INS 
Detention Standards, § 13 (IIl)(A)(l)-(3) (2000) [hereinafter DOM], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/opsmanual/index.htm. 
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adult male detainees at any given time and is usually full. No women are 
held at the Varick Facility. On average, the Varick Facility receives thirty 
to thirty-five new detainees each day for a total of approximately 12,000 
detainees a year. Detainees are generally held at Varick for under thirty 
days before being transferred to another facility or, in some cases, 
released.48 
The detainees OHS chooses to prosecute in the New York Immigration 
Court49 are usually transferred to one of the county jails in New Jersey from 
which OHS has rented bed space. The only exception appears to be 
detainees with significant medical needs who are sometimes held for an 
extended period at the Varick Facility, presumably because they are harder 
to place in county jails and because OHS is able to provide Varick Facility 
detainees with medical care at nearby St. Vincent's Hospital. The detainees 
DHS chooses not to prosecute in the New York Immigration Courts can be 
transferred anywhere in the country; though in recent years most are sent to 
facilities in Texas and Louisiana.so 
Men arrested by DHS in the five boroughs of New York and in nearby 
Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties are initially detained at the 
Varick facility. These detainees come into OHS custody in many different 
ways. Most are taken into custody when they are released from state 
criminal custody-though often the release is from pretrial custody or after 
a dismissal, and thus these detainees may not have criminal convictions. 
Other detainees are arrested by ICE during home raids, where ICE 
purportedly seeks a target individual but has increasingly been focusing on 
"collateral arrests" of unauthorized immigrants.SI Others are arrested by 
OHS for civil immigration violations after being denied some immigration 
benefit, such as naturalization or adjustment of status, or upon entering or 
reentering the country, or when they appear in immigration court. The 
48. See generally Rosaly Kozbelt, Due Process at Varick Street, FED. B. COUNCIL NEWS, 
Dec./Jan./Feb. 2009, at 14. 
49. The New York Immigration Court has two locations. Most New York immigration 
judges sit at the court located at 26 Federal Plaza, but two judges sit at the court located in 
the same building as the Varick Detention Facility. These two judges handle the detained 
docket; virtually all the detained immigrants prosecuted in New York will appear before one 
of these two judges. 
50. See discussion infra Part II.D.i (regarding the impact of DHS transfer policy on 
detainee access to legal representation). 
51. See Nina Bernstein, Despite Vow, Target of Immigrant Raids Shifted, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2009, at Al; Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Priorities Questioned: Report Says Focus 
on Deporting Criminals Apparently Shifted, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2009, at A2; see also BESS 
CHUI , LYNLY EGYES, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & JAVA VASANDANI, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A 
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS 10--11 (2009), available at 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedF iles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-7 41 /UC _I CE-
Home-Raid-Report%20U pdated.pdf; MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL 
WISHNIE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE'S 
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 1-2 (2009), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP _Feb09.pdf. 
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detainees come from a broad range of countries and many are limited in 
English proficiency. 52 
C. Existing Legal Resources at the Varick Facility 
Any assessment of the barriers to quality legal representation must begin 
with an acknowledgement of existing available legal resources. 
Those Varick Facility detainees whom DHS decides to prosecute in New 
York, have their cases heard in the Varick Street Immigration Court. While 
there are no comprehensive statistics available regarding the rate of 
representation at the Varick Street Immigration Court, one study suggests 
that twenty-five percent of respondents at the Varick Street Court appear 
pro se. 53 This is substantially better than the national average: nationally 
fifty-eight percent of respondents appeared pro se in fiscal year 2007 (most 
recent available data).54 However, since the Varick Street Immigration 
Court handles cases of detained respondents and respondents who have 
been released from DHS custody, we would expect to find that substantially 
more than twenty-five percent of the detained respondents at the Varick 
Street Court will appear pro se. 55 
These statistics do not, however, mean that the representation rate of 
Varick Facility detainees is higher than the national average. As discussed 
further in Part III.D.i, many Varick Facility detainees do not have their 
cases heard at the Varick Street Immigration Court but, rather, are 
eventually transferred to other jurisdictions-many to Louisiana and 
Texas-where they are significantly less likely to obtain representation. 
The vast majority of respondents with counsel at the Varick Street 
Immigration Court have private attomeys.56 Presumably, the higher 
number ofrepresented respondents at the Varick Street Court is attributable 
to the relative abundance of attorneys practicing in New York and to the 
ability of detainees' families to access such attorneys in their local 
communities. The pro bono resources available to the respondents at the 
Varick Immigration Court remain dwarfed by the demand for such 
resources. 57 In addition, despite the relatively higher representation rates, 
52. See supra notes 34, 45 and accompanying text. 
53. See N.Y. UNIV. CHAPTER OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 10, at 4, 15 
( stating that of the 400 cases observed at the Varick Immigration Court during 2006-2007, 
twenty-five percent appeared pro se and, of those, thirty-two percent were still actively 
seeking representation or had been abandoned by their attorney). 
54. See EOIR2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note I , at GI fig.9. 
55. N.Y . UNIV. CHAPTER OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 10, at 15; see also 
supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
56. Based upon the accounts of the immigration judges who sit at and supervise the 
Varick Street Immigration Court, the percentage of represented respondents is estimated to 
be between fifty and seventy-five percent. 
57. See also supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. The judges noted only two 
public interest organizations that regularly appear at the Varick Street Immigration Court: 
The Legal Aid Society' s Immigration Law Unit and The Bronx Defenders. These 
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the immigration judges expressed deep concern about the quality of many 
of the private attorneys that appear before them.58 
DHS reports that all new detainees at the Varick Facility are shown a 
legal orientation video produced by the Florence Immigration and Refugee 
Rights Project. However, this video was produced in June 1999 and does 
not reflect the substantial changes that have occurred in immigration law 
since that time. 59 Detainees are also provided with a list of pro bono legal 
services providers.60 However, only one of the organizations on that list 
regularly handles detained immigration cases.61 
Recently, the Varick Facility began permitting the Legal Aid Society's 
Immigration Law Unit access to detainees for weekly legal orientation and 
individualized brief advice and counseling sessions. Legal Aid 
subsequently established a partnership with the New York City Bar Justice 
Center and the Pro Bono Committee of the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association (the Varick Street Partnership). The Varick Street Partnership 
in turn has begun recruiting volunteer lawyers from various New York City 
law firms and law school clinics62 to staff regular legal counseling sessions 
for detainees at the Varick Street Facility. 
Unfortunately, in part because of limits in the partnership's capacity, and 
in part because of the limited space available for such activities,63 a very 
small percentage of Varick Facility detainees have access to this service.64 
In any given week the Varick Street Partnership will provide brief advice 
and counseling to ten to twenty detainees through this program. 
Accordingly, the vast majority of Varick Facility detainees do not have 
access to this service.65 DHS has also refused advocates' requests to 
organizations handle only a handful of cases on the court's docket. See Interview with 
Immigration Judge, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2009). 
58. Interview with Immigration Judge, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2009). 
59. See, e.g. , REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (codified 
as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act 
of 200 I, Pub. L. No. I 07-56, 115 Stat. 272 ( codified as amended in scattered titles and 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
60. See U.S. Dep't. of Justice, List of Free Legal Services Providers, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probono/freelglchtNY.htrn (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
61. According to interviews with the immigration judges, only the Legal Aid Society 
regularly takes detained cases. The Bronx Defenders is not on the pro bono list because it 
does intake exclusively through the Bronx Criminal Courts. See Interview with Immigration 
Judge, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2009). 
62. The Immigrant Rights Clinic at NYU School of Law, Immigration Justice Clinic at 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and the Immigration Law and the Safe Harbor Project 
at Brooklyn Law School have all begun participating in the project. 
63. Attorneys through this project may see only five detainees at any given time. 
64. See Interview with Maria Navarro, Supervising Attorney of Legal Aid Immigration 
Unit, in N.Y., N.Y. (Nov. 7, 2008) (on file with author); see also CITY BAR JUSTICE CTR., 
FAST FACTS ON THE NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT AT VARICK FEDERAL DETENTION 
FACILITY (2009) (noting that in first several months of the partnership, fifty-two detainees 
received services). 
65. See supra Part 11.B (discussing size of Varick Detention Facility population). 
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provide detainees, in advance of these counseling sessions, with the 
criminal rap sheets that would allow for more expeditious and accurate 
legal assessments. Nevertheless, the Partnership has been able to ascertain 
that thirty-eight percent of the detainees whom they have interviewed are 
eligible for some form of relief, 66 though the Partnership is not equipped to 
provide full representation. However, the Varick Street Partnership is an 
important initiative that does provide critical legal consultations and can 
facilitate placement of some pro bono cases. 
D. Barriers to Quality Legal Representation/or Detainees 
at the Varick Facility 
l . OHS Detention and Transfer Policy 
The single greatest barrier to representation for Varick Facility detainees, 
as identified by virtually all of the various actors interviewed for this report, 
is DHS's detention and transfer policies. As discussed earlier, respondents 
in detention are significantly less likely to be able to obtain counsel, and 
those detained in remote locations, away from families and cities rich in 
legal resources, face particularly acute barriers. 
Two aspects of DHS's detention and transfer practices are, therefore, 
significant obstacles to respondents obtaining and maintaining 
representation. First, OHS has taken an extremely broad view of the 
mandatory detention provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act67 
and, as a result, has deprived itself and immigration judges of discretion to 
review the appropriateness of detention for individual respondents.68 Under 
this broad view of the mandatory detention law, many respondents who 
pose no substantial risk of flight or danger to the community are held in 
custody and, therefore, have difficulty obtaining counsel.69 
Second, though OHS refused to discuss its transfer policy for this report, 
all of the relevant actors interviewed observed that OHS regularly transfers 
detainees to faraway remote detention facilities, often making multiple 
66. See CITY BAR JUSTICE CTR., supra note 64, at I. 
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006). 
68. See, e.g. , In re Saysana, 24 I. & N. Dec. 602, 605-06 (BJ.A. 2008) (adopting the 
DHS position that an alien can be subject to mandatory detention as a result of an arrest that 
occurs subsequent to the Transition Period Custody Rules (TPCR) expiration date, even 
though that arrest did not lead to a conviction); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 127 (BJ.A. 
2001) (adopting DHS position that a criminal alien who is released from criminal custody 
after the expiration of the TPCR is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to section 
236(c), even if the alien is not immediately taken into custody by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service when released from incarceration); In re West, 22 I & N Dec. 1405 
(BJ.A. 2000). 
69. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (upholding the mandatory detention 
statute against a claim that due process requires an individualized assessment of risk of flight 
and dangerousness). 
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transfers for a single detainee, without regard to whether the detainee has 
obtained counsel in his current location. 
When DHS originally takes a detainee into custody it generally issues a 
Notice to Appear (NTA), the charging document for an immigration 
removal proceeding. However, contrary to law, these NT As frequently do 
not include the time and place where the proceedings will be held.7° So 
detainees have no initial notice of the jurisdiction in which they should 
obtain counsel. Furthermore, DHS regularly transfers detainees to far away 
jurisdictions even after an attorney has entered a notice of appearance with 
DHS in New York.71 This includes cases where a respondent has 
requested, or even had, a bond hearing at the Varick Street Court and where 
an attorney has formally entered an appearance with that court.72 
In addition, a separate but related transfer issue is DHS's recent practice, 
in some cases, of transferring detainees whose cases are being heard in New 
York to distant detention centers, in Alabama for example, in between court 
appearances. This significantly interferes with an attorney's ability to 
communicate with the client and to prepare the client to testify.73 
Collectively, DHS's transfer practices are a major impediment to detainees 
attempting to obtain counsel. 
In published reports, DHS has explained its transfer policy as a necessary 
byproduct of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary bed space in detention 
centers located near cities with high immigrant populations.74 It claims that 
it is difficult to secure sufficient bed space near cities like New York 
because space is limited, costs are high, and, in some instances, local 
communities oppose construction of new detention facilities. 75 Thus, DHS 
prefers to establish detention centers in remote areas of southern states 
where, presumably, space is ample, costs are low, and communities are 
more welcoming of such facilities. 76 Such areas are, of course, less likely 
to have abundant legal resources ( either private or pro bono) and are great 
distances from the homes and families of most detainees. 
A further aggravating factor in DHS transfer policy is that there is no 
reliable system to notify families, attorneys, or even the court when a 
70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(l)(G)(i). 
71. The notice of appearance form for DHS is known as Form G-28. U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE, Form G-28 
(2000). 
72. The notice of appearance form for immigration court is known as Form EOIR-28. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OMB#l 125-0006, 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY OR REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE THE 
IMMIGRATION COURT (2009). 
73 . See, e.g., Velasquez v. Reilly, No. 09-2093, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2009) 
(habeas petition challenging transfer based on interference with access to counsel). 
74. Immigration Transfers Add to System's Problems (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 11 , 
2009) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast] (statement made by John Torres, ICE), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=I00597565. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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detainee is transferred.77 Accordingly, without adequate telephone access, 
as discussed in Part 11.D.ii, detainees can be missing in the black box of 
immigration detention for days, without any way to locate them, whenever 
they are transferred. DHS claims it sends out a notice within twenty-four 
hours of transfer, presumably to the detainees' attorney, but not a single 
immigration attorney interviewed for this article had ever received such a 
notice in the regular course ofrepresentation. Moreover, unlike the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and many state correctional systems, DHS has no 
online inmate locator where attorneys and families can quickly find the 
locations of their clients and loved ones.78 Finally, detainees themselves 
are often unable to notify attorneys and families when they are transferred. 
Cell phones and most other belongings are confiscated upon admission to 
detention facilities, and thus many detainees lose the numbers of attorneys 
and loved ones. Moreover, while the telephone policies at facilities vary 
widely, they often involve exorbitant fees and very limited access. 
The cumulative impact of DHS's transfer policy is a significant 
disincentive for private and pro bono attorneys to take on detained clients in 
removal proceedings. Once an attorney enters an appearance in 
immigration court, she may only withdraw from representation by motion 
with the court's perrnission.79 Accordingly, if an attorney enters an 
appearance on a detained case she risks being required to make costly 
appearances in courts thousands of miles away. Some immigration courts 
in Texas, where many Varick Facility detainees ultimately land, require 
personal, rather than telephonic, appearances, even for brief procedural 
master calendar hearings. The travel costs associated with such 
representation are, therefore, prohibitive to most respondents and pro bono 
service providers. Motions to change venue to return a client to a facility in 
a jurisdiction where she has previously obtained counsel are frequently 
denied.80 
77. One immigration judge interviewed for this report explained that sometimes even 
DHS attorneys cannot account to the court for the current whereabouts of detained 
respondents. See Interview with Immigration Judge, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2009). 
78. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons, BOP: Inmate Locator Main Page, 
http: //www.bop.gov/iloc2/Locateinmate.jsp (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Inmate 
Locator] . The Inmate locator can help to find DHS detainees in BOP facilities but does not 
contain info on DHS detainees in local jails or private facilities and thus is not a 
comprehensive system of all immigration detention facilities. 
79. 8 C.F.R. § 292.4 (2009). 
80. See, e.g., Pergjoni v. Holder, 311 F. App'x 892, 896 (6th Cir. 2009); Martadinata v. 
Attorney Gen. of U.S., No. 08-1575, 2009 WL 82698, at •2 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2009); Frech v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 491 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007); Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 
546 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Singh, 2009 WL 422059 (BJ.A. Jan. 28, 2009); In re Agbai, 2008 
WL 4722689 (BJ.A. Oct. 3, 2008); In re Lomba, 2008 WL 3861958 (BJ.A. July 11, 2008); 
In re Ag,Jayo-Diaz, 2007 WL 4182270 (B.I.A. Oct. 16, 2007); In re Silva, 2007 WL 
2299588 (B.I.A. July 23, 2007). 
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2. Communication Barriers Between Attorneys and Detained Clients 
The many significant impediments to communicating with detained 
clients also create a strong disincentive for attorneys to accept 
representation of detainee cases. Beyond the burden of making court 
appearances, each time a client is transferred the attorney and client face a 
new set of barriers to their effective communication. While DHS has 
published a manual that sets forth standards for immigration detainees' 
access to counsel,81 the manual is not binding82 and in practice detainees' 
access to telephones, their legal papers, and other modes of communication 
vary widely from facility to facility. The lack of uniformity in the detention 
standards at various facilities also serves to undermine detainees' ability to 
understand and utilize whatever limited rights of communications they may 
have. Immigration judges complain that they are unable to advise pro se 
respondents looking for counsel of their communication options because the 
rules vary from facility to facility and are even unknown to the court. 
Moreover, while the Varick Facility's website claims, "[w]hen a detainee 
departs the facility, his or her mail is sent to the forwarding address,"83 in 
practice, letters from counsel are routinely returned, rather than forwarded, 
when a detainee has been transferred. For many attorneys, the significant 
communication barriers created by DHS's transfer policy make it 
impracticable to assume representation for detained immigrants. 
Even for respondents who are not transferred beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Varick Street Immigration Court, the lack of a centralized nearby 
detention facility is yet another barrier to quality representation for some. 
Detained respondents who have their cases heard at the Varick Street Court 
will be held in one of several county jails in New Jersey, from which DHS 
81. According to the 2000 edition of DHS's Detention Operations Manual (DOM), 
detainees may make direct calls (as opposed to collect calls) to courts or legal service 
providers within eight hours of making such a request, DOM, supra note 47, § 16(III)(E), 
and may meet seven days a week, including holidays, with current or prospective legal 
representatives for eight hours a day on regular business days and for four hours on holidays 
and weekends, id. § I 7(III)(l)(2). Private consultation rooms are to be made available for 
legal visits, documents may be exchanged but will be inspected (although not read), id. § 
17(III)(l)(9)--{10); however, for those in expedited removal, confidentiality will only be 
ensured during legal visitation hours, not if the visit is made during general visitation hours, 
id. § l 7(IIl)(J)(4}-{5). 
82. See generally Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, No. 08-CV-40567 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Apr. 30, 2008) (pending lawsuit by two nonprofit organizations and two individual 
plaintiffs who filed suit requesting that DHS promulgate comprehensive, binding regulations 
governing detention standards for detained immigrants); ACLU FOUND. OF S. CAL. & NAT'L 
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM: SUBSTANDARD 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND INEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 1 (2007) ("The U.S. government 
has failed to promulgate binding minimum standards for the conditions of confinement for 
detained immigrants. In addition, it has failed to ensure that detention facilities comply with 
the nonbinding standards that exist."). 
83 . Varick Federal Detention Facility-New York, NY, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/facilities/varick.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
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rents space. There are currently at least five different facilities in New 
Jersey that hold DHS detainees. 84 Some are over sixty miles away from 
Manhattan and several are inaccessible by public transportation.85 If an 
attorney is contemplating making detained respondents a significant part of 
her practice, she is likely to end up with clients scattered across New Jersey, 
some in facilities located as far as seventy-four miles apart from each 
other. 86 Moreover, unlike many county jails, which hold pretrial detainees 
on criminal matters, DHS will not produce respondents to the Varick Street 
Court or Detention Facility upon request for counsel interviews. Finally, 
DHS's Detention Operations Manual only provides for free local calls to 
counsel; therefore, calls from detainees in New Jersey to New York 
attorneys are extremely expensive, even in those facilities that observe the 
nonbinding DOM rule.87 Accordingly, the time and expense involved in 
meeting with detained clients leads many attorneys to forego representation 
on detained cases and others to forego client meetings and preparation. 
3. Specific Barriers to Pro Bono Representation 
The primary barrier to pro bono representation is, of course, the scarcity 
of resources for public interest legal service providers doing deportation 
defense and the systemic funding challenges that underlie this scarcity. 88 
With its many large law firms, New York is relatively rich in pro bono legal 
services, yet the immigration judges surveyed reported that they very rarely 
encounter private attorneys handling pro bono matters at the Varick Street 
Immigration Court. 
It appears that there are several factors that contribute to the relative lack 
of engagement of private attorneys doing pro bono work at Varick Street 
Court. The large firms that are richest in pro bono resources tend not to 
84. These facilities include Elizabeth Detention Center and jails in the following 
counties: Bergen, Essex, Middlesex, Monmouth, and Newton. See Detention Watch 
Network, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/dwnmap (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
Sussex County Jail also houses detainees. See Press Release, ACLU-NJ, Immigration 
Detention Report Outlines Concerns of Abuse (May 15, 2007), http://www.aclu-
nj.org/news/immigrationdetentionreport.htm. 
85. Sussex County Jail, located at 41 High Street, Newton, NJ 07860, is not accessible 
by public transportation according to Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2009). Similarly, Monmouth County Jail, I Waterworks Road, Freehold, NJ 07728, 
would require two walks and two buses, totaling two hours, to reach it from the Varick Street 
Immigration Court. Id. 
86. This is, for example, the distance between Monmouth City Jail and Sussex City Jail. 
87. Specifically, the DOM says, "The facility shall not require indigent detainees to pay 
for the types of [legal] calls listed above if they are local calls, nor for non-local calls ifthere 
is a compelling need. The facility shall enable all detainees to make calls to the INS-
provided list of free legal service providers and consulates at no charge to the detainee or the 
receiving party." DOM, supra note 47, § 16(IIl)(E). However, in practice this generally 
means respondents pay extremely high fees for calls. See, e.g. , NPR Broadcast, supra note 
74 (respondent states that he had to pay twenty-five dollars for fifteen minutes on the phone). 
88. See supra Part I.D and accompanying text. 
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have a significant immigration practice and, therefore, some firms lack the 
institutional knowledge to provide in-house supervision to associates 
handling deportation defense matters. This, however, tells only part of the 
story, as many of the City's large law firms do regularly have associates 
handle certain categories of removal defense cases, most often asylum 
claims. Accordingly, the firms are willing to look past the lack of 
institutional knowledge in some areas. Several of the individuals 
interviewed for this study suggested that law firms are simply squeamish 
about taking on deportation defense cases for people who are detained or 
have had some encounter with the criminal justice system-two categories 
ofrespondents that make up the bulk of the cases at the Varick Street Court. 
Hopefully the involvement of several New York law firms with the new 
Varick Street Partnership will begin to change this dynamic. 
For those reputable private attorneys with some expertise in immigration 
practice there is a different set of barriers. First, many such attorneys are 
either solo practitioners or work at small firms and, therefore, simply have 
fewer resources to expend doing pro bono work. Second, the relatively 
larger firms that handle immigration matters tend to have a practice that 
focuses on business immigration law and not removal defense. Thus, many 
of the immigration attorneys in the city who are most financially able to 
assume a significant pro bono responsibility are out of their comfort zone 
doing deportation defense. 
Finally, even when there are attorneys willing to accept pro bono 
representation for detained respondents at the Varick Street Court, there are 
real barriers to identifying appropriate cases for representation. Because of 
the communication barriers discussed above and the specialized knowledge 
necessary to make an initial legal assessment of the viability of a 
respondent's potential defenses to deportation, it is often difficult to connect 
willing pro bono providers with appropriate cases. 89 
The immigration judges interviewed for this report felt uncomfortable in 
most cases, under the current regime, playing the role of screening cases 
and recruiting pro bono counsel. The weekly legal orientation and 
individualized brief advice and counseling sessions that Varick Street 
Partnership has begun is a promising model to identify appropriate cases. 
However, because of OHS detention and transfer policies many of the 
viable cases identified by the Partnership will not be heard in the New York 
Immigration Courts. The attorneys conducting the legal screening 
generally have no way of knowing whether the cases will be heard at the 
Varick Street Immigration Court or whether the detainees will be 
transferred and face removal proceedings thousands of miles away. 
89. Most legal screenings of detainees will also require follow-up factual investigations 
and/or legal research to determine the viability of potential legal defenses that often involve 
unsettled issues in this rapidly developing area oflaw. 
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Because of the uncertainty of eventual venue, it can be very difficult to 
place even very promising and sympathetic cases. 90 
One promising recent development in the Varick Street Immigration 
Court is increased access to pro bono counsel for bond hearings for 
detained respondents. Most local pro bono legal service providers had been 
unwilling to file requests for bond hearings on behalf of Varick Street 
detainees because of the fear that DHS would eventually initiate 
proceedings at some distant court and the pro bono attorneys could be 
required to continue representation. As a result of a productive 
collaboration with the Varick Street Partnership, the Varick Street Court has 
now made clear that it will grant motions to withdraw made by pro bono 
counsel at the conclusion of bond representation when requested.91 This 
type of reasonable practical accommodation designed to facilitate increased 
representation should be a model for other policy changes. 
4. Unscrupulous and Incompetent Lawyering 
For the reasons discussed throughout Part ILE, even those respondents at 
the Varick Facility who do obtain counsel are all too likely to receive 
ineffective assistance. The immigration judges interviewed for this report 
identified three primary causes of the incompetent representation they 
observe. Many attorneys who perform inadequately are perfectly capable 
practitioners who, under the financial pressures discussed in Part I.C, have 
simply taken on more clients than they can competently handle. Others are 
unscrupulous and take significant fees on cases where respondents have no 
viable defense to deportation. Finally, some simply lack the skills or ability 
to provide competent representation. 
There is also a significant problem, it seems, with the unauthorized 
practice of law in this area. That is, many of these high volume 
immigration outfits, particularly those run out of notario or travel agency 
offices, appear to use nonattorneys to do virtually all of the legal 
representation other than the court appearances. We encountered anecdotal 
evidence in interviews with respondents of nonattorneys conducting all 
client interviews and drafting all applications and court submissions; often, 
clients met attorneys for the first time only once they appeared in court.92 
90. In addition, EOIR has, of late, taken some admirable steps to encourage pro bono 
representation. See generally U.S. Dep't of Justice, EOIR Legal Orientation and Pro Bono 
Program, http ://www.usdoj .gov/eoir/probono/probono.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2009); 
Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge David Neal to All Immigration Judges and 
Court Officials (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Neal 
Memo]. 
91 . The basis for such grants is an EOIR memorandum that instructs immigration judges 
to provide reasonable accommodations to pro bono counsel in order to facilitate their 
representation. Neal Memo, supra note 90. 
92. See N.Y. UNIV. CHAPTER OF THE NAT'L LA WYERS GUILD, supra note 10, at 16 (noting 
"several" attorneys failed to attend hearings, turned in poor work, were unprepared, or had 
not met with the client prior to the hearing date, or engaged in unprofessional conduct, 
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One theme that emerged with regard to the low quality of representation 
was the lack of effective attorney discipline and oversight mechanisms. For 
the reasons discussed in Part LE, respondents themselves are often ill-
equipped to identify and report attorney incompetence to the proper 
oversight authorities. Accordingly, some third-party oversight seems 
particularly important in this area of practice. 
Attorneys practicing before immigration courts are subject to two distinct 
disciplinary bodies: first, the Executive Office for Immigration Review's 
(EOIR) Office of General Counsel is authorized to suspend or expel 
attorneys from practice before the immigration courts, and, second, the state 
bar disciplinary authorities are authorized to suspend or disbar attorneys 
from the practice of law. However, the immigration judges, who are in 
many ways best positioned to identify incompetent lawyering, report 
several institutional barriers to providing effective oversight and referrals to 
these disciplinary bodies. First, EOIR has not provided clear guidance to 
immigration judges regarding disciplinary procedures and has sometimes 
been inadequately responsive to immigration judge referrals of cases for 
discipline.93 Second, the immigration judges are not permitted, under a 
U.S. Department of Justice policy, to report attorney misconduct to the state 
bar disciplinary authorities. Finally, the crushing caseloads immigration 
judges handle coupled with their routine observations of incompetent 
lawyering, make it impracticable to regularly take the time necessary to 
document and file disciplinary complaints against attorneys. 
The greatest barriers to quality representation for detainees at the Varick 
Facility fall into the four categories discussed above: (1) DHS detention 
and transfer policy; (2) communication barriers between attorneys and 
detained clients; (3) specific barriers to pro bono representation; and (4) 
unscrupulous and incompetent lawyering. There is some reason to believe 
the effects of DHS's detention and transfer policy are a particularly acute 
obstacle for Varick Facility detainees because it is a temporary holding 
facility and because of the shortage of detention bed space in the northeast. 
However, while the severity of the barriers may vary, these issues are 
clearly national problems. In contrast, the shortage of pro bono resources 
may be an even greater problem in areas of the country with smaller legal 
communities and fewer philanthropic resources. So, while these barriers 
may play out differently in different areas of the country and in different 
facilities, there is little doubt that these are national issues that call out for a 
national solution. 
including two instances where the attorney had accepted payment but did not appear at the 
hearing). 
93. Notably, some of the immigration judges interviewed for this report cited recent 
improvements in this area. See Interview with Immigration Judge, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 9 & 
13, 2009). 
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III. POLICY PROPOSALS: INCREASING QUALITY REPRESENTATION AT THE 
VARI CK FACILITY AND BEYOND 
In order to address the four categories of barriers to quality representation 
identified in Part III.D, we have developed the following policy proposals. 
We recognize that these proposals are no magic bullet and that they do little 
to address the systemic forces underlying the immigration representation 
crisis discussed earlier in Part I. However, these proposals are meant to be 
practical responses to the current situation which will , in ways both big and 
small, meaningfully reduce the barriers faced by detained, and in some 
circumstances nondetained, immigrants seeking deportation defense 
representation. 
We also recognize that most of these proposals come at a cost, some 
small and some larger, to the government. However, some, but not all, of 
these costs will be offset by the savings the government would experience if 
more respondents, particularly detained respondents, had competent 
counsel. Currently, many prose detainees (and detainees with incompetent 
or unscrupulous attorneys) languish in detention for months, and sometimes 
years, fighting cases they have absolutely no chance of winning. If 
properly advised by competent counsel, a substantial number of these 
detainees would agree to be deported or receive voluntary departure. 
Substantial government savings would thereby be realized in lower costs 
for DHS's Office of Detention and Removal Operations, which pays for 
detention, and lower costs for DHS's Office of Chief Counsel, which 
litigates removal cases for the government in the immigration courts. 
Additionally, there would be lower costs for the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review, which hears removal cases at the agency level, lower 
costs for the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, which litigate removal cases for the 
government in the federal courts, and lower costs for the federal judiciary, 
which hears appeals of removal cases. 
A. Addressing DHS's Detention and Transfer Policies 
There are several steps OHS could take on its own to alter its detention 
and transfer policy to reduce barriers to representation. 
1. Review Mandatory Detention Position 
The text of the mandatory detention statute states, 
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who ["is 
inadmissible" or "deportable" based on certain criteria primarily related to 
criminal convictions] when the alien is released, without regard to 
whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, 
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and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned 
again for the same offense.94 
565 
DHS has adopted the broadest possible reading of this text. First, DHS 
takes the position that the "is deportable" and "is inadmissible" language 
applies even to individuals who have bona fide challenges to deportability 
or inadmissibility.95 In addition, with respect to the "when released" 
language, DHS takes the following position: (1) it applies not only to 
respondents DHS takes into custody upon their release from criminal 
custody, but also to anyone released from criminal custody at any time after 
October 8, 1998, regardless of how many months or years pass before DHS 
takes them into custody;96 (2) it applies even to people who have only been 
in pretrial custody and have never served a sentence of incarceration;97 and 
(3) it applies even if the time in state custody was unrelated to the criminal 
conviction that otherwise brings the individual within INA§ 236(c).98 
One of the most significant steps DHS could take to reduce barriers to 
representation is to revisit its broad reading of the mandatory detention 
law.99 Through regulation or mere policy change DHS could restore 
discretion to itself and to immigration judges to evaluate the risk of flight 
and dangerousness of many respondents who have bona fide challenges to 
removal and who are not taken into DHS custody upon their release from 
criminal custody for one of the designated offenses. This could lead to a 
significant reduction in the detained population and thereby facilitate 
greater access to quality representation. too 
At a time when policy makers across the country are rethinking the 
efficacy and fiscal implications of the mass incarceration policies that have 
dominated criminal justice policy in recent decades, it may also be an 
appropriate juncture for Congress to rethink the cost-benefit analysis of the 
current mandatory detention regime. DHS has already begun 
experimenting with alternative supervision models, such as electronic ankle 
bracelets and supervised release programs, which can help assure 
respondents' attendance at hearings at significantly less cost and without 
the same level of intrusion on their liberty or their ability to access counsel. 
It is difficult to see the net benefit of a regime that strips DHS and EOIR of 
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(l) (2006). 
95. See In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 126 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 799, 806 (B.I.A. 1999). 
96. See In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 136--37 (B.I.A. 2001); In re West, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.1.A. 2000). 
97. See In re West, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1408. 
98. In re Saysana, 24 I. & N. Dec. 602, 608 (B.1 .A. 2008). 
99. In the alternative, Congress could amend INA § 236(c) to clarify that DHS 's broad 
reading is incorrect and to restore greater discretion in detention decisions. 
100. DHS could also realize significant cost savings with the reduced detained 
population. 
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any discretion to set bail, or utilize such alternative supervision methods, 101 
even for a permanent resident with a minor decades-old drug offense who is 
eligible for and likely to receive cancellation of removal. 
2. Revise DHS Detainee Transfer Policy 
First and foremost, DHS should change its transfer policy to prohibit 
transferring detainees out of a jurisdiction where an attorney has entered an 
appearance, either with the immigration court or with DHS. While there 
may be some administrative inconvenience and additional costs involved in 
such a policy shift, the benefits would be substantial. Not only would this 
foster more effective communication with counsel, it would eliminate a 
tremendous obstacle to representation currently causing many private and 
pro bono attorneys not to handle detainee cases. 102 In addition, DHS should 
provide immediate notice to counsel whenever a client is transferred or, 
when the detainee has no counsel of record, to family members. 
For detainees who have not yet obtained counsel, DHS should provide 
prompt notice of their right to a bond hearing (or Matter of Joseph 103 
hearing, if DHS claims they are subject to mandatory detention). DHS 
should allow detainees sufficient time to request such hearings in the 
jurisdiction in which they were arrested and should not transfer any 
detainee with a bond or Matter of Joseph hearing request pending. 
DHS should also immediately focus on locating facilities near 
immigration population centers and in locations where there 1s a 
demonstrated capacity to provide pro bono and other legal 
representation. 104 There is currently a bill pending in Congress to require 
DHS to do just this, and DHS has recently stated its intention to work 
toward this goal.105 
101. It is worth noting that the statutory text of INA § 236(c), commonly referred to as 
the mandatory detention law, uses the word "custody," not "detention," and that such 
alternative supervision models have, in other contexts, been held to constitute custody. See, 
e.g., Yong v. INS, 208 F .3d 1116, 1118 n. l (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, it should not take 
an act of Congress for OHS to move toward utilizing alternative supervision models in 
mandatory detention cases. 
102. See supra Part 11.D.i. 
103. In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999). 
104. In the interim, while respondents in New York cases are still being housed in New 
Jersey, OHS should allow such detainees to be produced upon request at the Varick Street 
Facility or Immigration Court for attorney visits. 
105. The bill, entitled Immigration Oversight and Fairness Act, provides in pertinent part, 
(D) LOCATION OF FACILITIES- Detention facilities shall be located, to the 
extent practicable, within 50 miles of a city or municipality in which there is a 
demonstrated capacity to provide competent legal representation by nonprofit legal 
aid organizations or other pro bono attorneys to detained noncitizens, including 
asylum seekers and other vulnerable immigrant populations. The Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall seek to use only facilities within the stated 50 mile radius 
by January I, 2012. 
H.R. 1215, I I Ith Cong.§ (3)(b)(4)(D) (2009). See also OHS Press Release, supra note 9. 
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3. EOIR Assertion of Authority over Detainee Transfers 
DHS's misguided transfer policy is, of course, first and foremost the 
responsibility of DHS to correct. However, insofar as DHS is slow to 
correct the problem, EOIR has some responsibility to exert authority over 
the transfer of detained respondents, at least to the extent the transfers 
undermine the fairness of removal proceedings or interfere with 
respondents' rights to secure counsel of their choosing. To the extent DHS 
is unwilling to take the above steps to improve access to representation for 
detainees, EOIR has several tools at its disposal to blunt the impact of 
DHS's detention and transfer policy. There are at least three important 
steps EOIR could take to address the issue. 
First, EOIR should promulgate regulations or amend its practice manual 
to establish clear rules regarding motions to change venue that implicate 
access to counsel issues. 106 Such rules should, at a minimum, establish a 
presumption in favor of granting respondents' change of venue motions 
when the respondent has secured counsel in the jurisdiction in which he was 
originally detained, in advance of being transferred outside that jurisdiction. 
This would allow attorneys to assume representation of a detained case with 
relative assurance that if DHS attempted to transfer the matter to another 
jurisdiction, the court would grant a change of motion to return the case. It 
would also create a disincentive for DHS to transfer counseled cases to far 
off jurisdictions. 
Second, as the system currently operates, a detainee ( or a detainee' s 
counsel) can request a bond hearing with the immigration court having 
jurisdiction over the location where the respondent is detained. 107 In the 
case of Varick Street detainees, this is, of course, the Varick Street 
Immigration Court. Upon receipt of such a request, the court is required to 
schedule a bond hearing within a matter of days. 108 In practice, when a 
Varick Street detainee submits a request for a bond hearing the Immigration 
Court schedules the required prompt hearing. However, DHS may decide 
to pursue removal proceedings against that respondent outside of New York 
and may transfer the respondent to some other jurisdiction in advance of the 
scheduled bond hearing. In such situations, the court should not acquiesce 
to DHS's defiance of the court's ordered hearing. The court can and should 
hold DHS accountable for its failure to produce respondents as ordered. If 
DHS refuses to respect the court's authority in this regard, the court should 
hold an in absentia bond hearing and, since the failure to produce the 
I 06. This is especially appropriate since DHS is systematically undermining the authority 
of the immigration courts to make appropriate venue determinations by failing to comply 
with the statutory requirement to list the time and place of proceedings on the initial 
charging instruments. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. If DHS listed the local 
New York immigration court, it would then have to make change of venue motions in order 
to transfer cases. 
107. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c)(l)(2009). 
I 08. 2 IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 123. 
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respondent is attributable to DHS, set the minimum bond permitted under 
the statute. 109 
Finally, EOIR should not permit DHS to undermine the fairness of 
removal proceedings by transferring detainees to far off jurisdictions 
between court appearances, thereby undermining respondents' ability to 
meet with counsel and prepare testimony. While conditions of confinement 
issues are not generally within the jurisdiction of the immigration courts, 
when such issues impact upon the fairness of the proceedings immigration 
judges oversee, judges have the power and responsibility to act. 
Immigration judges should direct ICE to confine respondents in facilities 
accessible to their local counsel and should terminate proceedings, as 
violative of due process and of respondents' statutory right to counsel, if 
ICE does not comply. 
EOIR has only limited tools at its disposal to address the transfer issue 
but it should utilize the tools it does possess fully. Collectively, these 
proposals would significantly blunt the impact that DHS's current detention 
and transfer policies have on the ability of detained respondents to obtain 
competent counsel. 
B. Addressing Communication Barriers Between 
Attorneys and Detained Clients 
There are four steps-one large and three small-that DHS could take to 
significantly reduce barriers to detained respondents' communication with 
counsel. 
l. Enact Enforceable Uniform Detention Standards 
DHS's Detention Operations Removal Manual (DOM) purports to set 
forth universal standards for immigration detention, including several 
specific prov1S1ons related to communications with counsel. 1 IO 
Unfortunately, the standards in the manual are unenforceable and many of 
the most important provisions explicitly exempt the many state or local 
correctional facilities from which DHS rents bed space. 111 As a result, the 
ability of detainees to effectively communicate with their lawyers and 
access legal materials varies greatly from facility to facility, and the 
109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2006). While it may seem extreme to have the merits 
of the bond determination turn on DHS's failure to produce a respondent, there is ample 
precedent in immigration practice for such an approach. For example, in removal 
proceedings, failure of a respondent to attend a hearing results in an in absentia removal 
order being entered against the respondent. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(a). 
110. See supra notes 81, 87. 
111 . Nearly every section begins with a statement that the state or local government 
facilities used through the Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGSAs) "may find such 
procedures useful as guidelines. IGSAs may adopt, adapt or establish alternatives to, the 
procedures specified for SPCs/CDFs [Service Processing Centers/Contract Detention 
Facilities]." DOM, supra note 47 . 
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standards set forth in the manual are not routinely observed. Recently, after 
DHS was ordered by a federal court to respond to a petition requesting 
enforceable detention standards, it denied the petition. 112 DHS would be 
wise to revisit the issues and enact enforceable and uniform standards to 
facilitate detainee communication with attomeys. 113 
2. Free Calls to Legal Services Providers 
The DOM currently states, "The facility shall not require indigent 
detainees to pay for [certain] local calls," including calls "to legal service 
providers, in pursuit of legal representation."114 Even if this were a 
regularly followed and enforceable standard, which it is not, this still does 
not enable the many detainees held in New Jersey jails to call the legal 
service providers in New York that work in the New York immigration 
courts where the detainees' cases are heard. In order to facilitate detainees 
finding and communicating with lawyers, DHS should allow detainees to 
make free calls to legal service providers regardless of how far away they 
are detained. At minimum, detainees should always be allowed to make 
free calls to legal service providers local to the immigration courts with 
jurisdiction over their cases, regardless of whether or not these calls are 
local to the detention facility. 
3. DHS Should Create a Web and Telephone Based Inmate Locator 
In the information age, there is simply no excuse for the situation that 
regularly occurs in immigration detention, where detainees are taken into 
custody or transferred, and family members, attorneys, and even the court, 
have no way to locate where they are. Virtually all major correction 
departments have inmate locator systems. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
for example, has an online inmate locator that can instantly provide the 
location of any inmate in the federal prison system by name or 
identification number. 115 The system even allows one to locate 
immigration detainees, but only those held in BOP facilities. It defies logic 
112. See generally Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
113. The manual deals with many issues beyond attorney client communication and 
access to legal materials, including, healthcare. While beyond the scope of this inquiry, the 
failure of the immigration detainee healthcare system has recently garnered considerable 
public attention. See Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Detainee Dies, and a Life Is Buried, Too, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at Al; Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of Neglect as 
Tighter Immigration Policies Strain Federal Agencies, The Detainees in Their Care Often 
Pay a Heavy Cost, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at Al; Nina Bernstein & Margot Williams, 
Immigration Agency 's Revised List of Deaths in Custody, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 2, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/nyregion/03detainlist.html? _r= I . Universal 
enforceable detention standards would, therefore, also be an important step forward in areas 
other than access to counsel. 
114. DOM, supra note 47, § III.E (on telephone access). 
115. See, e.g., Inmate Locator, supra note 78. 
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that DHS does not provide a simple way to locate immigration detainees. 
When attorneys are unable to locate clients for days it is sometimes a minor 
inconvenience and sometimes disastrous, as critical time-sensitive 
communications can be delayed. DHS should create a comprehensive 
multilingual online and telephonic inmate locator. 
4. DHS Should Regularly and Promptly Forward Detainee Mail 
After a Transfer 
An easy and relatively inexpensive way for DHS to reduce 
communication barriers between attorneys and detained clients would be to 
forward detainee mail after a transfer. This is more a matter of policy 
implementation than formulation, as DHS already claims that it is its policy 
to forward detainee mail to the new facility when a detainee has been 
transferred. 116 Unfortunately, in the experience of the interviewees for this 
report, this policy is uniformly not followed. Mail from counsel is regularly 
returned to them as undeliverable (often many days later) if a detainee has 
been transferred. DHS obviously knows where a detainee has been 
transferred and there is no reason why mail from counsel, or from any other 
source, cannot be regularly and promptly forwarded. In addition, DHS 
should assure that detainees have access to the necessary postage to 
communicate fully with counsel regardless of their ability to pay. 
Some of these steps may seem trivial, but the current policies and 
practices around phone access, locating transferred detainees, and mail can 
significantly compromise a detainee's access to counsel. This is 
particularly so at the beginning of a respondent's detention when he has 
reached out to an attorney in attempt to secure representation and may 
imminently be brought before an immigration judge pro se. In such 
situations, counsel may need to deliver critical instructions for such an 
appearance or need critical information to determine whether she can 
assume representation. DHS 's current policies and practices around 
attorney-client communication can make that impossible. 
C. Addressing Specific Barriers to Pro Bono Representation 
Because of the intractable barriers to funding pro bono deportation 
defense representation at sufficient levels 117 and because of the significant 
collateral costs to the federal government of detaining pro se litigants, 118 
some government investment in pro bono services is required to address the 
immigration representation crisis. 11 9 
116. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra Part I.D. 
118. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
I 19. There is a provision of the INA that provides, 
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any appeal 
proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the 
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1. Provide Legal Screening and Assessments to Immigration Detainees at 
Government Expense 
The most significant drain on government resources caused by the lack of 
access to competent counsel is a pro se detained litigant advancing frivolous 
claims. As discussed in the Introduction, these cases are a substantial drain 
on the resources of OHS, EOIR, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and the 
federal courts. 120 If properly advised by counsel, detainees would have no 
interest in advancing such claims as they cause detainees months and 
sometimes years of unnecessary detention before their inevitable 
deportation. 
The recent initiative by the Varick Street Partnership, whereby pro bono 
attorneys screen detainees to identify viable legal defenses and counsel 
clients who do not have any defenses about voluntary departure options 
and, sometimes, about their interest in conceding removal, provides a 
promising model for expansion and replication. Unfortunately, at its 
current funding level, the Partnership reaches a very small percentage of 
detainees. 
EOIR has also been experimenting with similar initiatives through its 
Legal Orientation Program (LOP). 121 The LOP is subcontracted out to 
nonprofit service providers, including the Florence Immigrant and Refugee 
person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to 
the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he 
shall choose. 
8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). Some have read this provision as prohibiting federal expenditure of 
money on immigration representation. However, the text of the statute does not provide 
such a broad rule. First, the section only purports to preempt any claim of a right to 
appointed counsel. The plain language does not prohibit a federal agency, in its discretion, 
from providing representation. Second, the provision only relates to representation "[i]n any 
removal proceedings." 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Accordingly, it does not appear to pertain to brief 
advice and counseling and legal screening of detainees by attorneys who do not enter 
appearances in removal proceedings. Indeed, a memorandum recently issued by two former 
General Counsels for the Immigration and Naturalization Service specifically considers this 
issue and concludes that 
under general appropriations law principles, federal agencies involved in 
administering the immigration laws have the discretion to expend appropriated 
funds to pay for legal representation because such funding could support and 
further important agency interests. Expenditures to increase representation rates 
for indigent individuals in removal cases would serve the purposes of the agencies' 
general appropriations by leading to more efficient immigration court proceedings, 
reduced detention costs, and better-informed decision making by Immigration 
Judges and the Board oflmmigration Appeals. 
Memorandum from Bo Cooper & Paul Virtue, former INS Gen. Counsels to Oren Root, 
Vera Inst. of Justice, Federal Funding for Direct Representation of Indigent Aliens in 
Immigration Proceedings (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also 
Memorandum from David Martin, Gen. Counsel, INS to T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Executive 
Assoc. Comm'r for Programs, INS, Funding of a Pilot Project for the Representation of 
Aliens in Immigration Proceedings (Dec. 21 , 1995). 
120. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
121. IMPROVING EFFICIENCY, supra note 8. 
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Rights Project (FIRRP), which pioneered the model. Early analysis of the 
LOP demonstrates that such legal screening programs reduce the length of 
removal proceedings and thereby provide "resource-saving benefits for the 
immigration courts and immigration detention system." 122 In addition, 
detainees who receive services from the LOP program were more likely to 
succeed on the merits of their cases and less likely to abscond, if released 
on bond, than similarly situated nonparticipants. 123 Still, the existing LOPs 
continue to serve a small and decreasing fraction of the immigrant detainee 
population. A recent study of LOP services concluded that "the expansion 
of detention has outpaced the expansion of funding for the Legal 
Orientation Program" and therefore "the numbers of people receiving LOP 
services represents a shrinking percentage of the overall detained 
immigration court population each year."124 
EOIR should expand its LOP program and launch a joint initiative to 
fund a pilot project expanding the Varick Street Partnership screening and 
counseling model to provide services for all Varick Facility detainees. 
Careful study should be done to evaluate the cost savings realized by all 
relevant actors and the time detainees are spared in detention. 
2. Empower Immigration Judges To Appoint Counsel in Appropriate Cases 
Given the reality of the statutory, precedential, and fiscal barriers to full 
representation for all respondents in removal proceedings, EOIR and, if 
necessary, Congress, should consider empowering immigration judges to 
appoint counsel at government expense in appropriate cases. Given the 
gravity of the liberty interest involved, 125 it offends notions of fair play to 
have respondents with viable defenses, for example, juveniles and the 
mentally ill, deported simply because they cannot secure counsel. 
Immigration judges are perfectly situated to identify the small body of cases 
where appointment of counsel is most necessary to achieve just results. 
Federal judges play this role once the cases reach the federal courts of 
appeals; however, in many cases, the most vulnerable respondents are 
unable to pursue their cases to the federal courts. Moreover, once a case 
gets to federal court, the damage is usually done-the record is closed and 
innumerable procedural obstacles can block substantive review. This 
proposal will undoubtedly cost the government money but it will be money 
well spent to achieve a just process. 126 
122. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND 
PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME, MEASUREMENT REPORT PHASE 11, at iv (2008), available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file= I 778/LO P%2Bevalution_updated%2B5-20-08. pdf. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at iv. 
125. See supra notes 15- 18 and accompanying text. 
126. There are strong arguments that due process requires the appointment of counsel, at 
least in the situations of particularly vulnerable respondents, if not as a general matter in 
removal proceedings. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 
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3. States and Localities Must Assume Some Responsibility for Funding 
Indigent Deportation Defense 
Given the intractable barriers to sufficient funding of indigent deportation 
defense services, state and local governments must revisit their historic 
reluctance to fund nonprofit deportation defense providers. State and local 
governments regularly fund legal services to support indigent residents 
engaged in litigation before other federal agencies, such as the Social 
Security Administration. New York State and City's interests are no less 
present when a City resident, who is the sole breadwinner for a family, 
faces deportation. In such situations, citizen and permanent resident family 
members are often left behind and become dependent on public benefits 
programs. Cities and states have an important role to play in addressing the 
immigration representation crisis, and it is in their interest to do so. 
D. Addressing Unscrupulous and Incompetent Lawyering 
We must begin from the premise that the current state of affairs in 
removal proceedings-with incompetent and unscrupulous attorneys as 
much the norm as skilled and ethical attorneys-is unacceptable and must 
change. This will require a significant culture shift as many players in the 
process see bad lawyering as an inevitable and inalterable feature of the 
removal system. It cannot be so. We must recognize the vast scope of this 
problem and accept that addressing the problem will require a significant 
undertaking, primarily on the shoulders of EOIR. 
l . EOIR Should Institute an Attorney Certification or Admission 
Requirement with a Probationary Period 
Currently, an attorney admitted to practice anywhere in the country can 
appear in any immigration court in the country. 127 EOIR should institute an 
admission or certification requirement for any attorney wishing to appear in 
immigration court. In addition, to whatever other criteria are developed, all 
attorneys should be admitted on a probationary basis initially. In each of 
their first five cases, for example, they would be required to note their 
probationary status on their Notice of Entry of Appearance and have the 
immigration judge fill out a simple confidential evaluation form at the 
conclusion of the representation to be submitted to EOIR. After reviewing 
the five evaluation forms, EOIR would make the determination whether or 
not to grant permanent admission or certification, to be revoked only 
85, 100-01 (2008); Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother 's House: Is U.S. 
Immigration Policy More Dangerous Than the Big Bad Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile 
Aliens?, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 609, 646 n.212 (2004); Mark T. Fennell, supra note 31; 
Sharon Finkel, Voice of Justice: Promoting Fairness Through Appointed Counsel for 
Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105 (200 I). 
127. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.l(f) (2009). 
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through the existing EOIR disciplinary process. This process would allow 
EOIR to screen out many incompetent or unscrupulous attorneys before 
they became involved in a large number of cases. 
An exception to the process should be available for pro bono counsel, 
who should be liberally admitted on a pro hac vice basis. Without this 
exception, any certification program may become a barrier to the 
recruitment of pro bono attorneys. 
2. Immigration Judges' Attorney Oversight Role Should Be Expanded 
Immigration judges have a front row seat for some of the worst abuses 
and failures of the immigration bar. Because of their tremendous caseloads, 
because of the time involved in filing and pursuing attorney disciplinary 
complaints, and because of the regularity with which they witness attorney 
misconduct, immigration judges are unable and unwilling to regularly refer 
attorney misconduct to the EOIR disciplinary authorities. The process for 
immigration judge referrals should be streamlined to lift the burden of filing 
and pursuing these claims off of immigration judges, and onto the EOIR 
disciplinary authorities. Furthermore, the Department of Justice rule 
currently prohibiting immigration judges from referring appropriate matters 
to the state disciplinary authorities should be amended to allow such 
referrals in appropriate cases. 
3. Deter Fee Abuses by Unscrupulous Attorneys 
The problem of attorneys overcharging unsophisticated respondents and 
changing fee agreements mid-representation is a story we have heard 
repeatedly. In order to deter such abuses, EOIR should require attorneys to 
attest on their Notice of Appearance Form EOIR-28, that they have a 
written and mutually signed fee agreement with a client, and that it has been 
translated into the client's best language and delivered to the client. This 
provision will, of course, not prevent all fee abuses, but it is an easy step 
EOIR can take to deter some such abuses. 
CONCLUSION 
The immigration representation crisis did not arise overnight, but rather 
has consistently deepened over time. The crisis is unquestionably worse 
among detained respondents and, accordingly, the sharp rise in immigration 
detentions over the past decade has aggravated the crisis significantly. 
While the Varick Facility has some unique attributes, it is nevertheless a 
useful lens through which to evaluate the systemic forces and individual 
policies that create barriers for detainees seeking competent counsel. The 
proposals developed through this study do not address the underlying 
systemic forces behind the immigration representation crisis and, therefore, 
will not solve these intractable problems. Rather, the proposals set forth 
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herein are aimed at altering government policies in efficient ways to avoid 
aggravating the problem and to facilitate detainee access to quality legal 
representation. We are hopeful that this work can be a useful starting point 
for all of the relevant actors to reflect upon what they can do to seriously 
address the nation's immigration representation crisis. 
